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Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?

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Introduction

Upon the recent death of Patriarch Alexey II of Moscow and All Russia, Sergei Lavrov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry (RFM), stated, "It is impossible to overestimate the contribution of the Primate of the Church to strengthening the positions of our Fatherland in the world and enhancing the international prestige of Russia."[1] First and foremost, the signing of the 2007 Act of Canonical Communion of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) signaled "a new stage in [the Russian Foreign Ministry's] efforts to consolidate the Russian world."[2] During the reign of Alexey II, especially during the Putin administration, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) expanded its role, uniting its mission with that of the RFM to secure the rights or "spiritual security" of the Russian diaspora as well as to reacquire

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1. Sergey Lavrov, "The Message of Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, to the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Over the Death of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia," available online at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/e99d01ee8637c3d6c3 257523003f9f6d?OpenDocument.
2. "Diplomacy Needs a Moral Foundation," *Diplomat* 173, no. 9 (2008): 5.

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property that had formerly belonged to the Russian Empire and had been lost during the Communist period. Furthermore, the church by collaborating with the foreign ministry has signaled that the church is indeed united with the state in promoting a greater Russia through the spread of Russian Orthodox Christianity.

In this essay, I will examine the relationship between the ROC and the RFM. In particular, I will focus on three roles that the ROC is providing. First, along with Putin's understanding of "spiritual security" the ROC, by consolidating its rule over the Russian diaspora, is expanding this concept outside of Russia proper. Second, the relationship is providing the opportunity for the reacquisition of Russian property that was lost during the Communist period. And third, through its relationship with the RFM the ROC has been able to expand the influence of the Russian government throughout the world. The resurgence of Russia in world affairs has created tensions within the Orthodox world, especially in regards to Western Europe. The concept of "canonical territory," whereby it is determined who has spiritual oversight over the Orthodox people of a particular area, has become a controversial topic, especially between the ROC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate (EP) of Constantinople.[3]

Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Foreign Ministry, and the Spiritual Security of the Diaspora

The Concept of Spiritual Security

In the *2000 National Security Concept*, the Putin Administration stated,

> Assurance of the Russian Federation's national security also includes protecting the cultural and spiritual-moral legacy and the historical traditions and standards of public life, and preserving the cultural heritage of all Russia's peoples. There must be a state policy to maintain the population's spiritual and moral welfare, prohibit the use of airtime to

3. See Daniel P. Payne, "Nationalism and the Local Church: The Source of Ecclesiastical Conflict in the Orthodox Commonwealth," *Nationalities Papers* 35 (2007): 831–52; Alexander Agadjanian and Kathy Rousselet, "Globalization and Identity Discourse in Russian Orthodoxy," in *Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Victor Roudometof, Alexander Agadjanian, and Jerry Pankhurst (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2005), 29–57; Archbishop Hilarion Alfeyev, "La notion du territoire canonique dans la tradition Orthodoxe," given at the International Symposium of Canon Law at the Catholic Theological Academy of Budapest, February 7, 2005; available at http://en.hilarion.orthodoxia.org/6_12.

promote violence or base instincts, and counter the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.[4]

This spiritual understanding of national security saw its beginnings in the pursuit of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations, which brought to an end the brief period of religious freedom that Russia experienced following the 1990 law on Freedom of Worship. In November 1996, then Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad commented about the problem of proselytism facing the ROC.[5] Once the 1990 law allowed for freedom of conscience, "hordes of missionaries dashed in, believing the former Soviet Union to be a vast missionary territory."[6] Instead of aiding the ROC in its missionary endeavors, these proselytizing groups worked against the church "like boxers in a ring with their pumped-up muscles, delivering blows." The blows were against the "people's national and religious sentiments," leading to a state where for many Russians, "'non-Orthodox' means those who have come to destroy the spiritual unity of the people and the Orthodox faith—spiritual colonizers who by fair means or foul try to tear the people away from their church."[7] In the eyes of the religious leaders of the ROC, Russia was losing its cultural identity as an Orthodox nation. As Wallace Daniel and Christopher Marsh state, "Unless the government affirmed Russia's traditional faiths against the aggressive actions of other religious groups and sects, the patriarch [Alexey II] maintained, the renewal of Russia's own spiritual traditions stood little chance."[8] Therefore, in this atmosphere, where the ROC believed itself as well as Russian culture to be under attack, Boris Yeltsin passed the 1997 law, differentiating traditional and nontraditional religions in Russia.[9]

Additionally, the idea arose that these foreign missionaries were actually covert foreign intelligence workers, gathering information about "Russian policies and strategic activities."[10] The

4. "2000 Russian National Security Concept," available at http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html.
5. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, "Gospel and Culture," in *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*, ed. John Witte, Jr., and Michael Bourdeaux, 66–76 (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999).
6. Ibid., 73.
7. Ibid., 73–74.
8. Wallace Daniel and Christopher Marsh, "Russia's 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience in Context and Retrospect," in *Perspectives on Church-State Relations in Russia*, ed. Wallace L. Daniel, Peter L. Berger, and Christopher Marsh, 29 (Waco: J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, 2008).
9. Ibid.
10. John Anderson, "Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?" *Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (2007): 194.

head of the religious studies faculty at the Russian Academy of State Service, Nikolai Trofimchuk, in 2001 argued in his book *Expansiya* that foreign missionaries, regardless of their intentions, "served the interests of the countries from which they came."[11] Therefore, more attention should be placed on the concept of "spiritual security" in the coming years.[12] In order to emphasize the spiritual danger facing Russia, Putin, in the 2000 National Security Concept, "drew a tight connection between religion, culture and nationality and stressed its central role in Russian culture and social order."[13] In response to the recent enthronement of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, Putin stated, "In the dialogue with other Sister-Churches, the Russian Orthodox Church has always defended and hopefully will continue to defend the national and spiritual identity of Russians."[14] Because Orthodoxy has been associated with Russian nationalism, that is, with Russian culture and heritage, as John Anderson states, "competitors (especially Catholics and 'sects') can be depicted as threats to the religion of the nation, and thus to the nation itself."[15]

In March 2002 Patriarch Alexey II, in a low-key ceremony, consecrated a church at the Lubianka headquarters of the Federal Security Agency.[16] According to Julie Elkner, instead of focusing on the past tensions between the security apparatus and the ROC, the ceremony had a different tone. As Elkner states, "the ceremony focused on the need for concerted actions aimed at combating the current threats posed to Russia's 'spiritual security,' as the Patriarch put it."[17] Certainly the patriarch was not alone in utilizing this concept. Ideologues of the right and left have been utilizing the concept for the defense of Russian culture against the expansion of Western culture. In 2003 Viktor Zorkal'tsev, Communist parliamentary deputy, defined spiritual security: "Freedom of conscience is only freedom when this is the freedom not only to believe, but to act. However, freedom of conscience has boundaries. And these boundaries can be defined by a single expression—spiritual security. Spiritual security is, if you like, one of the conditions of a civil

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Inna Naletova, *Perspective* 12, no. 3 (2002); available at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol12/Naletova.html.
14. "Russian Orthodox Church to work for Russian identity—Putin," *Interfax,* February 3, 2009; available at http://www.interfax-religion.com.
15. Anderson, "Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church," 195.
16. "FSB Gets Its Own Place to Worship," *Moscow Times,* March 7, 2002; available at http:// www.moscowtimes.ru/article/938/49/247959.htm; Julie Elkner, "Spiritual Security in Putin's Russia," available at http://historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-26.html.
17. Elkner, "Spiritual Security."

society."[18] This spiritual security, then, serves as the basis for protecting and uniting the Russian Orthodox people against threats to its spiritual and cultural well-being, especially by limiting the amount of freedom experienced in the civil society itself.

Spiritual Security and the Russian Diaspora

As stated earlier, Sergei Lavrov, head of the RFM, stated that the signing of the 2007 Act of Canonical Communion between the Moscow Patriarchate and the ROCOR represents "a new stage in our efforts to consolidate the Russian World."[19] In September 2003, Putin met with Metropolitan Laurus in New York in order to discuss the possibility of the reunion of ROCOR with the ROC.[20] As the *Current Digest* described the process, "The ROC, the ROCA and the Russian president are all pleased that the idea that a 'superpower' like our country should have a 'superchurch' is being advanced as the main argument in favor of reunification."[21] A year later, ROCOR called an All-Diaspora Council to discuss this possibility, and in June 2007 Metropolitan Laurus and Patriarch Alexey II co-celebrated the Divine Liturgy in Moscow, marking the end of the eighty-year schism.

While many celebrated the spiritual and ecclesiological significance of this reunion, others were skeptical of the political meaning behind the merger. Yuri Zarakhovich, in an article for *Time*, stated that Putin's aim was for the "take over" of ROCOR by the Moscow Patriarchate in order to "launch a new globalized Church as his state's main ideological arm and a vital foreign policy instrument."[22] Indeed, "just as ROC congregations in other countries served as foreign intelligence centers in the 1970s," remarked *The Current Digest*, "tomorrow the ROCA could become an outpost for Russian geopolitical aims."[23] Furthermore, Putin commented on the reunion as a part of the spiritual security of the Russian nation, "equat[ing] Russia's 'traditional confessions' to its nuclear shield, both . . . being 'components that strengthen

18. Ibid.
19. See note 2.
20. According to Irina Papkova, ROCOR had been discussing this possibility internally for the past fifteen years. Personal communication with Irina Papkova.
21. "The Strength and Weakness of Orthodoxy," *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 55, no. 51 (January 21, 2004): 19–20.
22. Yuri Zarakhovich, "Putin's Reunited Russian Church," *Time.com*, May 17, 2007; available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1622544,00.html.
23. "The Strength and Weakness of Orthodoxy," 20.

Russian statehood' and create necessary preconditions for internal and external security of the country."[24]

In fact, the 2007 reunification, while being the largest and most important overture to the Russian diaspora by the Putin administration and the ROC, is not the only attempt at reuniting the Russian émigré communities throughout the world in order to expand Russian influence and protect emigrant Russians.[25] As Patriarch Kirill states,

> There are parishes and monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church in many countries. They not only unite Russians, but also the natives of other countries in the canonical space of the Moscow Patriarchate, specifically the citizens of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. All those people find themselves drawn to the faith of their ancestors, their people, to Orthodoxy, when they land in foreign countries. The Church communities seek to unite Orthodox Christians so that they can, together, get stronger in the faith, pray and partake of the Sacraments. Moreover, our parishes fulfill a cultural mission. They are an important link between their Motherland and the people living far away from their native country.[26]

The ROC and the RFM work together, according to Lavrov, for "standing up for the rights and liberties of Russian citizens and our compatriots living abroad."[27] He continues, "The Foreign Ministry of Russia actively helps communities of the Russian Diaspora, even to meet their spiritual needs." This includes the processes of building new churches and transferring lost properties back to Russian ownership.[28] Patriarch Alexey II[29] and Igor Ivanov, minister of the RFM, affirmed this joint mission of the ROC and the RFM. Ivanov placed "the protection of the interests of our citizens and compatriots abroad" with the idea of "reliable security."[30] According to Patriarch Kirill, this is the first priority of the joint diplomacy between the ROC and the RFM.[31]

In fact, at a joint conference between the ROC and the RFM held in April 2001, Kirill commented that the churches, especially built in Western Europe prior to the Communist period, were for the

24. Ibid.
25. Nadia Kizenko, "Houses of Worship: Church Merger, Putin's Acquisition," *Wall Street Journal*, May 25, 2007; available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118006040893914329.html?mod=Letters.
26. "Church Diplomacy Is Not Just a Matter of Inter-Church Relations," *Diplomat* 173, no. 9 (2008): 14.
27. "Diplomacy Needs a Moral Foundation," 5.
28. Ibid., 7.
29. "Live Peacefully with All Men," *Diplomat* 173, no. 9 (2008): 9.
30. Igor Ivanov, "Formation of New Russian Policy Completed," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 47, no. 4 (2001): 3.
31. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, "The Foreign Service of the Russian Orthodox Church," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 48 no. 4 (2002): 147.

sustenance of the religious life of the Russian people living abroad. Principally, the purpose of such churches, found in "Stockholm, Copenhagen, Paris, Nice, Cannes, Biarritz, San Remo, Florence, Vienna, and Baden-Baden," was to sustain the unification of the Russian people. Such churches were built by the state under the guidance of the RFM and the ROC.[32] As Kirill notes, however, these properties were lost during the Soviet period, simply because the state "abandoned all church property that had belonged to Russia."[33] But according to Sergei Hackel, the situation is much more complicated than simply the relinquishing of church property by the Soviet state.

In Western Europe, the issue of church property is tied to the fragmentation of the Russian diaspora following the Bolshevik Revolution and the Russian emigration during the 1920s. In particular, Patriarch Tikhon issued a decree on May 5, 1922, "'liquid[ating]' its structures" under pressure from the Soviet government.[34] Furthermore, many of the Russian parishes under the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Evlogii Georgievskii of Paris left the ROC and came under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1931, placing their properties under the control of Constantinople.[35]

Kirill insists that the properties do not properly belong to the church, but rather to the Russian state, since it was the state that built these edifices and then later relinquished them in a manner that could be construed as criminal. As he stated at the 2001 conference, "As for the main objective of our interaction today, I believe it is above all to recover the property of Russia—not of the Russian Church."[36] He continues, "These churches—if they belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church and if there is indisputable legal evidence of that—should still belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. But if they once belonged to Russia, they should belong to Russia."[37] In this vein, there have been several court cases regarding the status of church property in Western Europe, causing the splintering of entire congregations. More will be said about this later in regards to the issue of canonical territory.

32. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, "Cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian Diplomacy: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 47, no. 4 (2001): 158.
33. Ibid., 159.
34. Sergei Hackel, "Diaspora Problems of the Russian Emigration," *Eastern Christianity*, ed. Michael Angold, *Cambridge Histories Online* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 545; available at http://histories.cambridge.org/extract?id=chol9780521811132A023.
35. Ibid., 543.
36. Kirill, "Cooperation," 159.
37. Ibid., 160.

This pursuit of the reacquisition of Russian church property abroad is tied to the issue of spiritual security in that church leaders as well as politicians see this process as fundamental for the unification of the Russian people with the Motherland. For instance, commenting on the transfer of the St. Nicholas Church in Bari, Italy, from the state of Italy to the ROC in April 2009, Kirill stated, "Today the Russian Orthodox Church face [sic] the need to guarantee external conditions for better reception of worshipers [in Bari] more than ever."[38] Upon receiving the keys to the church, President Medvedev stated that the transfer of property was a sign of the "deep connection between our cultures and people,"[39] signifying the intimate relationship between the church and the state in its diplomatic mission. Therefore, the ROC working together with the RFM promotes the spiritual security of the state through the care of Russian compatriots abroad through their unification, both spiritual as well as physical. Additionally, the ROC and the RFM work together to promote "Russianness" by maintaining the union of the people with their homeland.

Moreover, the ROC and the RFM collaborate to protect the spiritual security of the Russian diaspora from non-Orthodox religions and especially from the spread of secularism. Here we witness the paternalistic nature of the relationship between the ROC and the Russian diaspora. As former Patriarch Alexey stated, "the main God-given principles of international relations are the perennial aspirations for peace, total commitment to religious/moral values, and the ardent wish to preserve traditions of faith at any cost."[40] Particularly, Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, who is head of the Department of External Church Relations, has been an outspoken critic of the spread of "militant secularism" in Western Europe as a threat against faith traditions. As Hilarion sees it, militant secularism is a pseudo-religion that is attempting to replace Christianity in Western Europe.[41] According to Hilarion, militant secularism is one of "two ongoing conflicts, or battles, which will inevitably affect the mission and witness of the Orthodox Church" in the twenty-first century.[42] He states,

38. "Patriarch Kirill Thankful to Russian, Italy Authorities for Transfer of Bari Church," *Interfax* March 2, 2009; available at http://www.interfax-religion.com.
39. "Transfer of Bari Church to Russia Is Historic Event—Medvedev," *Interfax* March 2, 2009; available at http://www.interfax-religion.com.
40. Patriarch Alexey II of Moscow and all Russia, "Religion and Diplomacy," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 47, no. 4 (2001): 150.
41. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, "Christianity and the Challenge of Militant Secularism," available at http://en.hilarion.orthodoxia.org/6_11.
42. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, "Orthodox Mission in the 21st Century," available at http://en.hilarion.orthodoxia.org/6_22.

> In modern secular society Christian values are being more and more marginalized and God is being driven to the outskirts of human existence. In many countries of the West it is now almost taken for granted that religion can operate only at the private level: you are free to believe in God or not, but this should in no way be manifested in your social life. Churches and religious communities are tolerated so long as they do not trespass their own borders, so long as they refrain from publicly expressing opinions that differ from those consonant with "political correctness." Should they begin to express such opinions, they are readily accused of intolerance.[43]

Especially the traditional faith communities of Orthodoxy and Catholicism are under attack from this militant secularism. It is the role of the Church, together with the RFM, to protect the interests of these communities in an increasingly secularizing Europe. As Hilarion states,

> Unfortunately, there are European politicians who are attempting to destroy the traditional, churchly way of life because this is precisely how they view the function of the secular state—to divorce the Church from the social arena. It is this attitude that the Orthodox Churches must combat, joining their efforts with all who are ready today to defend traditional against liberal attitudes, the religious against the "common human" values, uniting those willing to defend the right of religions to express themselves in society.[44]

The second conflict facing the Church in Western Europe goes along with the first. According to Hilarion, "There is now a deep-seated discrepancy between Christian communities, such as the Orthodox, that attempt to preserve the sacred Tradition of the ancient, undivided Church, and those, like many Reform communities, that have revised and continue to revise Tradition in conformity with secular standards."[45] As certain versions of Protestant Christianity have aligned themselves with militant secularism, they represent a threat to a common Christian witness against the secularism that is challenging traditional Christian values and practice. Pressure is placed upon traditional Christianity to likewise assimilate and accept these values which are foreign to its ethos.[46] According to Hilarion, what is at stake in this battle over secularism is the "survival of Christian civilization and of

43. Ibid.
44. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, "Christianity and the Challenge of Militant Secularism."
45. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, "Orthodox Mission in the 21st Century."
46. See Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, "The Orthodox Church in the Face of World Integration," *The Ecumenical Review* 53, no 4 (2001): 479–84.

those peoples who until recently identified themselves with Christianity."[47] The ROC is caught in a battle over the soul of Europe, which includes its own people living in diaspora.

The Expansion of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Issue of Canonical Territory

In April 2003, Patriarch Alexey issued a communiqué to the hierarchs of Russian tradition in Western Europe calling for the possibility of a union of these churches—ROCOR, the Western Exarchate under Constantinople, and the diocese of Western and Central Europe under Moscow—under the jurisdiction of the ROC. According to Alexey's intentions, the unified church would have autonomous status, yet be sponsored by the ROC in the formational process.[48] According to the communiqué, the problem that needed to be addressed was the "sundered parts of the Russian Church" and the needs of the "Church life of our compatriots in the *diaspora*."[49] Yet, as Sergei Hackel points out, this idea of the unification of the churches of Russian tradition under the auspices of the ROC was a continuation of proposals that had been promulgated in 1975 and 1976 to do the same, yet in "beguiling terms." According to Hackel, "the patriarchate had not forgotten its imperialist dreams of years gone by."[50] By invoking the term "Russian tradition," did Alexey simply infer that he was concerned only with uniting Russian churches under his omophorion? Or was he concerned about uniting all Orthodox Christians in Western Europe under the jurisdiction of the ROC? It seems that the patriarch was concerned more about the former than the latter, for the consolidation of the Russian diaspora under the tutelage of the ROC, claiming that such churches are under the "canonical territory" of the Church.[51]

As I have argued elsewhere, the ROC and the Patriarchate of Constantinople are in a war for souls concerning the issue of canonical territory.[52] Especially, this conflict involves the churches of Estonia and Ukraine. However, in 2006, a conflict emerged concerning the

47. Archbishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, "Orthodox Mission in the 21st Century."
48. Hackel, "Diaspora Problems of the Russian Emigration," 550.
49. Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexis, "Europe and Its Future," available at http://www.orthodox-christian-comment.co.uk/news-futureofrussianparishesinwesterneurope.htm.
50. Hackel, "Diaspora Problems of the Russian Emigration," 550.
51. See Agadjanian and Rousselet, "Globalization and Identity Discourse in Russian Orthodoxy," for the contemporary use of this idea and its correspondence with Russian identity.
52. See Payne, "Nationalism and the Local Church."

Diocese of Sourozh in England in regards to the communiqué for church unification in Western Europe.

The Western Exarchate under Constantinople and the Diocese of Sourozh, which is under the authority of the ROC, developed their own indigenous Orthodox traditions in their respective countries, no longer understanding themselves to be diaspora churches.[53] Additionally, these churches have assimilated to the countries in which they find themselves. As Xenia Dennen, chairman of the Keston Institute, writes, the conflict between the ROC and the Sourozh Diocese was "between an 'open' type of Orthodoxy, open to the culture around it, concerned with exploring the faith, unafraid of 'the other,' as opposed to one that is 'closed,' defensive, and focused on power and control."[54] Philip Walters also notes the "out-going and inclusivist" nature of Sourozh compared with the "mood in the Orthodox Church in Russia [which] has been increasingly inward-looking and exclusivist."[55]

The problem emerged due to the enormous influx of Russian émigrés to Western Europe and England during and following the years of *perestroika*. At first, the influx simply created a pastoral problem for the churches because they had assimilated to the culture of their respective countries, using the language of the indigenous peoples as is customary in Orthodoxy. However, the pastoral issue became political due to the complaints of Russian émigrés to the ROC concerning their lack of pastoral care. Particularly, the Diocese of Sourozh, under the leadership of Metropolitan Antony Bloom, did not understand itself to be "a vehicle for preserving Russian national identity."[56] Instead, it was to be a center of Orthodoxy for all people regardless of nationality. According to Dennen, this ecclesial culture ran afoul of the vision of the ROC. She writes, "This principle of acculturation was by implication condemned by Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk when, in a statement on 24 October 2006, he said that the Russian Orthodox Church should, on the contrary, seek to prevent assimilation and to preserve a separate cultural and religious identity for Russians abroad."[57] In the eyes of the ROC, the Diocese of Sourozh had

53. "Declaration of the Council of the Archdiocese," available at http://www.exarchat.org/article.php3?id_article=557.
54. Xenia Dennen, "Russian Orthodoxy in Great Britain: Death Knell or Growing Pains," *Humanitas* (2007): 62.
55. Philip Walters, "The Power Struggle in Orthodoxy," *Church Times*, May 26, 2006; available at http://www.churchtimes.co.uk, accessed August 5, 2006. See also Philip Walters, "Turning Outwards or Turning Inwards? The Russian Orthodox Church Challenged by Fundamentalism," *Nationalities Papers* 35, no. 5 (November 2007): 853–80.
56. Dennen, "Russian Orthodoxy in Great Britain," 64.
57. Ibid.

become an embarrassment. Protodeacon Peter Scorer, formerly of the Diocese of Sourozh, in an interview with Radio Liberty, stated,

> Thanks to the labours of Metropolitan Anthony, Sourozh was a diocese unique in the entire Moscow Patriarchate. [. . .] Now this free, *sobornaya* (communal) diocese, unlike any other within the Russian context, has become an embarrassment for Russia. They would like to see them "all of a kind," so that the churches abroad, which are being built in many countries, would be something like the embassy churches before the revolution. They are representations of Moscow abroad, and are controlled not by their local bishops, but by the DECR [Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate].[58]

In April 2006 Bishop Basil of Sergievo, the successor to Metropolitan Antony, after coming under attack for the openness of the diocese and its refusal to kow-tow to the ROC authorities, requested to be released from Patriarch Alexey and the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate so that he could then seek to be placed under the authority of Constantinople. In response to his request, Alexey retired him, removing him as the overseer of the Sourozh Diocese. Consequently, Basil requested from Constantinople to be placed under its authority, which was granted on June 8, 2006, creating a separate diocese in the British Isles under the authority of the Western Exarchate in Paris.[59]

It appears that part of the issue regarding the conflict in the Sourozh Diocese was the degree to which this church had developed its own traditions, especially ones that were considered to be out of keeping with traditional Russian Orthodox Christianity. In a commentary written concerning the conflict, Fr. Andrew Phillips of the Cathedral of the Dormition in London argued that it was precisely the acceptance of "modernism" and its rejection of traditional Russian Christianity that created the conflict. According to Fr. Andrew,

> The split is between those who wish to practice the Russian Orthodox Faith, regardless of their nationality or preferred language of worship or even beloved saints, and those who, quite simply, do not love the Russian Orthodox Tradition. The latter want to combine contemporary Western humanism with a form of Russian Orthodoxy. It does not work. Thus, at present they refuse the discipline of the Russian Orthodox Church inside Russia, as it is now rapidly being restored after three generations of militant atheism, just as they refused in the past the discipline of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR).[60]

58. Quoted in Dennen, "Russian Orthodoxy in Great Britain," 68.
59. Ibid., 66–67.
60. Andrew Phillips, "Sourozh: Russian traditions without the Russian Orthodox Faith," available at http://www.orthodoxengland.btinternet.co.uk/sourozh1.htm.

For Fr. Andrew, this modernism had affected the Paris Exarchate during the 1920s with the acceptance of the teaching of Fr. Sergius Bulgakov, which was deemed heretical by the ROC and ROCOR.[61] Thus, not only is the issue regarding the Diocese of Sourozh and the Western Exarchate in Paris associated with the spread of Russian nationalism, it also pertains to the issue of spiritual security with the ROC attempting to consolidate its own influence against that of renovationism and secularism.

However, the creation of multiple ecclesiastical jurisdictions in Western Europe, which the ROC on the one hand is attempting to prevent by uniting the Russian churches under its authority but which *de facto* is occurring through the expansion of the Russian church into the territories that belong to these other churches, creates a problem regarding "canonical territory." According to Inna Naletova, "The church seeks to assist the state in 'reuniting' the former empire in the so-called 'canonical territory' of the Moscow Patriarchate. Such a 'reunion' is based on the idea of common faith of persons of many nationalities and on the common canonical structure centered around Moscow and covering the entire territory of the former Soviet Union."[62] However, as Alex Agadjanian and Kathy Rousselet demonstrate, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the identification of Orthodoxy with Russianness, "canonical territory" took on a transnational character.[63] No longer was it limited to the territory of the former Soviet Union or even the Russian Empire; rather it was tied to the very idea of Russian identity. Thus, wherever there are Russians in the world, the ROC makes the claim that they are part of its jurisdiction.[64]

61. Andrew Phillips, "The Time-Bomb That Went Off: Happier Prospects after the Sourozh Schism," available at http://www.orthodoxengland.btinternet.co.uk/timebomb.htm.

62. Naletova, *Perspective* 12, no. 3 (2002); available at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol12/Naletova.html.

63. Agadjanian and Rousselet, "Globalization and Identity Discourse in Russian Orthodoxy," 40–41.

64. A recent exception to this occurred in the Russian-Georgian conflict over South Ossetia. The Russian state desired that the ROC cooperate with the state in claiming canonical territory over the Russians of South Ossetia. However, the ROC chose to go against the Russian state and continued to recognize the traditional canonical territory of the Orthodox Church of Georgia over the territory of South Ossetia. This has actually caused some tension between the ROC and the RFM. See Paul Goble, "Moscow Patriarchate Losing Privileged Status as Russia's Religious Representative Abroad," available at http://politicom.moldova.org/news/moscow-patriarchate-losing-privileged-status-as-russias-religious-representative-abroad-162266-eng.html; see also "Church Altars Are not Political Tribunes," available at http://www.georgiatimes.info/?lang=en&area=interviewItem&id=10315&path=interview.

This creates a violation of Orthodox canon law, which stipulates that there can be only one church in one locale. The establishment of multiple churches in a single territory goes against the ecclesiological basis of the Orthodox Church, where there is to be only one bishop celebrating the Eucharist in each city or diocese. When approached by the ROC to reunite with the mother church, the Western Exarchate in Paris cited that it had already become a "local and multinational Church, situated indeed since the emigration outside the territorial and canonical boundaries of any autocephalous Church, including the Patriarchate of Moscow."[65] By introducing a Russian Church in the territory of the Western Exarchate, the ROC was violating the canonical territory of the Western Exarchate. As the Archdiocese of the Western Exarchate stated,

> For us, as for our predecessors, the overlapping of jurisdictions on the same territory can never be justified because it directly contradicts territorial ecclesiology (notably that derived from the 34th Canon of the Holy Apostles). Equally unjustifiable is the demand by various autocephalous Churches, for direct obedience from their nationals, scattered across the countries of western Europe as in every other part of the world. This direct obedience can only succeed in reinforcing the overlapping of jurisdictions. The present situation is only a phase resulting from our history; it must be replaced by arrangement agreed with the dioceses of the other Patriarchates represented in our countries. For these ecclesiological reasons the proposal of the Patriarchate of Moscow is inappropriate. When a unified local Church is established in our country, it will be done out of scrupulous regard for the canons, especially the territorial definition of the Church. As it is, the Patriarchate of Moscow has no more jurisdiction in our countries than the other territorial Churches.[66]

Consequently, the ROC has not changed its position regarding canonical territory. In fact, it has continued a process of expanding its jurisdiction into other territories, establishing churches with the aid of the RFM. Such examples as Pyongyang, Havana, Beijing, Hong Kong, Angola, Mar del Plata (Argentina), Quito, Caracas, Rome, and Singapore have or will have churches built in the near future expanding Russian Orthodox influence throughout the world. Many of these churches will serve as a means of cultural and political dialogue between Russia and the host nation. Furthermore, such expansion challenges the EP as the voice of world Orthodoxy.[67]

65. "Declaration of the Council."
66. Ibid.
67. While the Orthodox churches do not have a single world leader as the Roman Catholic Church, the ecumenical patriarch has traditionally been viewed as the "first among equals" of the various local churches. Today, many observers note the tension between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Moscow Patriarchate over the issue of who has the authority to speak for the world Orthodox community.

By expanding into territories, which the EP claims under Canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, multiple overlapping jurisdictions are being established throughout the world. It is to be noted that the ROC does not accept the EP's interpretation of Canon 28, which gives jurisdiction over the "barbarian lands" to the bishop of Constantinople. While this is certainly an inter-Orthodox ecclesiological debate, what makes this more problematic is the relationship that the ROC has with the Russian state.

Conclusion

In an interview with RIA Novosti, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, stated in regards to the Russian relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean,

> The Foreign Ministry and Russian diplomatic missions in the countries of the region give priority attention to the deepening of interaction with compatriots, and comprehensively help the consolidation of the diaspora and its organizations and the expansion of the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church. . . . We will continue to work for the fullest possible unfolding of the rich creative potential of the Russian World uniting us.[68]

As I have argued throughout this essay, the ROC has collaborated with the RFM for the purposes of expanding and consolidating the Russian world. Together, in the name of spiritual security, they have done this through attempts to reunite with the other churches of Russian tradition that exist in the Russian diaspora and through the reacquisition of Russian church property that had been lost during the Soviet period. They have met with some success in their endeavor—especially to be mentioned is the reunion of the ROC with ROCOR. Consequently, the expansion of the ROC's canonical territory has led to conflicts involving some of these churches, especially in Western Europe.

While the stated purpose of the work of the ROC and the RFM has been the spiritual care for their compatriots abroad, there is the appearance that something more is at stake, the expansion of Russian influence. Due to its favored position with the state, the ROC is expanding transnationally, both in influence and territory.

68. "Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Interview with RIA Novosti on Russian Relations with the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin," available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/40dff6a7982643e5c3257523003f9f19?OpenDocument.

Moreover, this relationship holds equal potential for the state. In order to be a world superpower once again, Russia needs an instrument that will serve as the unifying cultural factor in its self-identity. That instrument is the ROC.